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RESPONSE TO CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON
Bruce A. Green and Rebecca Roiphe
In November 2018, Chief Justice John Roberts defended the federal
judiciary in response to President Trump’s tweet attacking a so-called
“Obama judge” in California who blocked an executive order placing
restrictions on asylum seekers. 1 The Chief Justice asserted that, “We do
not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges.
What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their
level best to do equal right to those appearing before them.” 2
Unpersuaded, President Trump tweeted back, “Sorry Chief Justice John
Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much
different point of view than the people who are charged with the safety
of our country.”3
As is often true in public debates, it matters how you define your
terms. President Trump may have been partly right if his point was that
different federal judges have different views about how best to interpret
and apply the law, and that their judicial philosophies tend to align with
their political or ideological preferences—that is, Republican appointees
tend to be more “conservative” and Democratic appointees tend to be
more “liberal” in their approach to the law. 4 Although one cannot predict
with certainty how any given judge will decide any individual question,
one can often identify who is more or less likely to be sympathetic to
certain legal arguments and positions. Studies confirm that, on
contentious legal questions, ideology matters—that on average, federal
judges decide differently depending on whether they were appointed by
a Republican or Democratic president. 5 That is why the Federalist Society
1. Katie Reilly, President Trump Escalates Attacks on ‘Obama Judges’ After Rare Rebuke
From Chief Justice, TIME (Nov. 21, 2018), http://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciarychief-justice-john-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/M2M8-G5SY].
2. Id. For a skeptical response, see Take Roberts Court Defense with a Grain of Salt,
ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.afj.org/blog/take-roberts-court-defense-witha-grain-of-salt [https://perma.cc/MG7R-ZD86].
3. Reilly, supra note 1.
4. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 739, 767–68 (2018).
5. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An
Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1201, 1259–60 (2012); see also Lawrence Hurley, Obama’s judges leave liberal imprint on U.S.
law, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-obama/obamasjudges-leave-liberal-imprint-on-u-s-law-idUSKCN1110BC
[https://perma.cc/27AA-KBZJ]
(discussing that Obama’s judicial appointments titled the judiciary in a liberal direction). For an
empirical study of how judges decide cases, see Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (concluding that judges make intuitive
snap judgements but sometimes override these decisions after deliberating).
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recommends and supports President Trump’s judicial nominees, 6 while
liberal interests groups oppose many of them. 7 In the voting booth, the
public understands that it matters who appoints judges.
On the other hand, the Chief Justice was right insofar as his point was
that federal judges are not beholden to the president who appointed them;
they are not expected consciously to favor the parties and legal positions
identified with that president or with that president’s party. 8 For example,
in deciding a legal challenge to an executive order, a federal judge should
bring the same philosophical and interpretive predispositions to bear
regardless of whether the president who issued the order was a
Republican or Democrat. While political ideology plays a role in judicial
decision-making, it does not directly determine the outcome of cases. 9
Judges look to precedent and employ various interpretive techniques and
accepted forms of legal reasoning.
In her article, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era,10 Professor
Cassandra Burke Robertson stakes out a middle ground between these
two conceptions.11 She suggests that even if judges make a conscious
effort not to decide cases based on partisan political identification, they
may unconsciously bring their partisan views to bear.12 Doing so may be
unavoidable.13 Social scientists tell us, for example, that when sports fans
view disputed plays, they perceive them more favorably to the team for
which they are rooting—and neuroscientists tell us that there is a neural
basis for their different perceptions. 14 While judges are professionals, and
6. See Sophie McBain, Who are the Federalist Society? Inside the right-wing group
picking Trump’s Supreme Court judges, NEW STATESMAN (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/north-america/2018/09/who-are-federalist-society-insideright-wing-group-picking-trump-s [https://perma.cc/KSQ3-8AGF].
7. See, e.g., Judicial Nominees, ALL. FOR JUST., https://www.afj.org/ourwork/issues/judicial-nominees [https://perma.cc/N242-NHBC].
8. Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 3–4 (explaining how hunches and intuitive responses do
not alone determine judicial decisions). Regardless of expectations, some contend that, at the
highest levels, judges do in fact tend to decide cases on political party lines, regardless of whether
the decision conforms to the judge’s general judicial philosophy. E.g., Sheldon Whitehouse, Sen.
Whitehouse: There’s a ‘Crisis of Credibility’ at the U.S. Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 15,
2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/02/15/sen-whitehouse-theres-a-crisis-ofcredibility-at-the-u-s-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/F9WL-HAD9] (charging that the
decisions of Republican appointees on the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate an “undeniable
pattern of political allegiance. Under [Chief Justice] Roberts, justices appointed by Republican
presidents have, with remarkable consistency, delivered rulings that advantage big corporate and
special interests that are, in turn, the political lifeblood of the Republican party.”).
9. Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 2–3.
10. Robertson, supra note 4.
11. See id. at 739.
12. See id. at 767.
13. Id.
14. See TIMOTHY J. ANDREWS ET AL., NEURAL CORRELATES OF GROUP BIAS DURING
NATURAL VIEWING 1 (2018).
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may make a stronger effort than sports fans to be impartial, unconscious
preferences likely influence their perceptions, too. For example, if the
roles were reversed in Bush v. Gore,15 and Al Gore had won the initial
count in Florida, are we confident that five Republican-appointed Justices
would have voted to end George W. Bush’s legal challenge?16
Professor Robertson sees it as a problem worth redressing that judges
may be influenced—or appear to be influenced—by “political bias” in
ways unseen by observers and unperceived by judges themselves. 17 The
problem involves the nature of judging and the legitimacy of courts in a
highly partisan age. Professor Robertson is aware that this is not a new
problem but argues that the increasingly polarized partisan climate calls
for a new response. 18 She acknowledges that the problem cannot
effectively be solved by disqualifying partisan judges because all judges
have partisan affiliations and political and ideological sympathies. 19
Moreover, it would be impossible to untangle political sympathies from
judicial philosophies and policy preferences; the latter are not only
unavoidable but desirable in a judge. 20 Professor Robertson proposes
various other procedural responses instead. 21
The most significant response, one that Professor Robertson does not
advance, would be to change how judges are selected. In most U.S.
jurisdictions, judges are either appointed by an elected official, as in the
case of Article III federal judges, or are themselves elected. There are
other ways to choose judges, however, that avoid or reduce partisan
political influence.22 For example, federal magistrate judges, who are
15. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
16. Compare Nelson Lund, “Equal Protection My Ass!”? Bush v. Gore and Laurence
Tribe's Hall of Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMM. 543, 545, 556 (2002) (defending the Court’s decision),
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1219
(2002) (defending the Court’s decision), and Ronald D. Rotunda, Yet Another Article on Bush v.
Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 283, 287 (2003) (defending the Court’s decision), with Jack M. Balkin,
Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001)
(“That the conservative Justices acted as they did suggested that their partisanship was so
thorough and pervasive that it blinded them to their own biases.”), and Michael S. Kang & Joanna
M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1424 (2016) (“[T]he partisanship of the many judges and political actors in
the 2000 postelection process uncannily predicted their decision-making for and against Bush and
Gore.”).
17. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 756–64.
18. See id. at 756–57.
19. See id. at 767–69.
20. See Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs?
Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 941, 965–67 (2002) (quoting and citing authority).
21. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 769–75.
22. For a small sample of the literature comparing different methods of judicial selection in
the United States, see, e.g., Hon. Diane M. Johnsen, Building A Bench: A Close Look At State
Appellate Courts Constructed By The Respective Methods Of Judicial Selection, 53 SAN DIEGO
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selected by the federal judiciary, are less likely than Article III judges to
be perceived as politically partisan. 23 An even more nonpartisan selection
process is employed in countries where judging is a profession separate
from the practice of law. 24 In legal systems where law graduates
immediately join, and then remain in, a judicial bureaucracy, judges are
unlikely to be identified with, or beholden to, a particular political party
throughout their judicial careers.25
We are not persuaded that such a radical change or Professor
Robertson’s more minor suggestions are needed, however. While we
agree that judges, as humans, are subject to all kinds of unconscious
thought processes, which likely include partisan identification, we are
less disposed than Professor Robertson to see this as a problem worth
redressing. We acknowledge social science teachings about unconscious
biases, including pernicious ones such as unconscious racial biases. But
we tend to think that judges’ humanity, including their unconscious
irrationalities and other human frailties, should simply be accepted, and
that we ought to focus on whether judges’ conscious decision-making
processes, including their express thought processes, adhere to
professional expectations. If so, we need not worry too much about what
L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2016) (reviewing five methods of selecting state appellate judges—partisan
election, nonpartisan election, legislative selection, merit selection, and “merit-confirmation”);
Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-partisan Judicial Campaigns, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 597, 598–99 (2005) (arguing that public funding of nonpartisan judicial elections will better
promote judicial independence and nonpartisanship than partisan judicial elections or judicial
appointments); Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in
New York City 1977-2000, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 791 (2004) (concluding that elected
judges are more beholden to interest groups than appointed judges).
23. See Christopher E. Smith, Merit Selection Committees and the Politics of Appointing
United States Magistrates, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 210, 229–30 (1987).
24. See John O. Haley, Judicial Reform: Conflicting Aims and Imperfect Models, 5 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 81, 93 (2006) (discussing civil law systems where “judges are members
of an elite corps of civil servants in one or more specialized ‘judicial service’ bureaucracies”). In
common law countries (other than the United States) where judges are generally selected to the
bench by other judges and serve for substantial periods of time without expectation of promotion,
there is also less partisanship than in the United States. See id. at 91 (“[A]s judicial selection in
the United States occurs either through the electoral process or by political appointment, political
accountability is assured but partisan politics necessarily permeates the selection and above all
retention processes.”).
25. This is not to say, however, that judicial bureaucracies better promote judicial
independence. On the contrary, where judges’ impartiality is secured through bureaucratic, rather
than democratic, accountability, judges may be more susceptible to inappropriate executive and
bureaucratic influence. See generally Neil Chisholm, The Faces of Judicial Independence:
Democratic versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and Promotion
in South Korea and Taiwan, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 893 (2014) (analyzing the two different
approaches to judicial independence). It is simply to say that judges who come up the ranks of
judicial bureaucracies are likely to be less susceptible to political-party influence and to be less
likely to identify, or appear to identify, with a political party.
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lies below the surface. 26
We have previously written in praise (within limits) of judges’
reliance on emotion—another unconscious, or at least non-rational,
thought process.27 Trial judges in particular are often personally affected
by the participants and the drama in their courtrooms. Appellate judges,
commentators, and scholars have, at times, chastised them for emotional
outbursts, suggesting that these displays are inconsistent with the role of
the judge. In contrast, we argue that emotional entanglement is not only
consistent with good judging, but it can also help judges manage their
courtrooms, empathize with litigants, and reach appropriate decisions.
Unlike emotional responses, unconscious partisan bias is not a useful
judicial trait. But it is no less a product of who we are as human beings.
Judicial decision-making is complicated. The fact that judges have
implicit biases, including biases correlating to partisan preferences and
political identification, does not mean that their implicit biases
necessarily have a significant role in judicial decision-making. When
evaluating self-interests and biases that might undermine a judge’s
professional judgment, one should acknowledge countervailing
incentives and influences. Judges may be motivated by professional
values such as fairness, consistency, and impartiality that largely offset
their unconscious biases. Ideally, judges’ commitment to norms of
impartial decision-making is reinforced insofar as their judicial peers, the
legal profession, or the public at large review their work and measure it
against these values. Particularly at the appellate level, judges have a
burden of justification—they must write opinions that satisfy norms of
judicial reasoning—and their justifications are scrutinized. If
professional pride does not influence judges to seek to avoid partisan bias,
then their self-interest in their professional reputation may do so.
Although unconscious political partisanship probably cannot be offset
entirely, it should not necessarily be identified as a particular cause of
concern. Judges, as humans, are subject to the potential influence of a
host of implicit biases, of which political partisanship is but one. 28 The
26. Our conclusions accord with those of empirical legal scholars who conclude that it is
not necessarily bad for judges to rely on intuition, even though intuition can include an
uncomfortable mix of bias and well-trained instinctual or common-sense responses. The key is to
empower judges to reject their worst instincts when possible. See Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at
33–41.
27. See Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, NYU ANN.
SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2018); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy
on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L.
497, 498–99 (2008).
28. See Understanding Implicit Bias, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY, OHIO ST. U., http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/
[https://perma.cc/8P6H-8BGD] (providing examples of implicit bias such as race, ethnicity, age
and appearance)
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ideal of some pure judicial core motivated only by reason is a myth not
worth pursuing.
Professor Robertson is clearly aware of the complexity of human
thought and judicial decision-making, rejecting caricatures of judges as
completely impartial or entirely motivated by partisan bias. 29 On the one
hand, there is President Trump’s view of judges as political actors
dressing up partisan ideology in judicial language. 30 On the other, Chief
Justice Roberts has portrayed judges as rational and the law as readily
discernible.31 Well before he rebuked President Trump’s twitter attack on
“Obama judges,” Chief Justice Roberts avowed at his confirmation
hearings that his job as a judge was “to call balls and strikes and not to
pitch or bat.”32 Professor Robertson acknowledges that judging inevitably
falls somewhere in between these two extremes.
Professor Robertson prudently embraces Professor Charles Geyh’s
goal of “impartial enough” judging, reminiscent of the 1950s popular
slogan of the “good enough mother.” 33 Professor Geyh acknowledges that
because society now accepts the premises of legal realism and the
inevitable role of personal and political interests in judging, it is illogical
to argue that judges are entirely impartial. 34 Bias is inevitable and
acceptable as long as it does not push the judge out of the range of what
we all recognize as legitimate judicial reasoning. Having dispensed with
the mythical extremes of judging encompassed by the pronouncements
of both Chief Justice Roberts and President Trump, what remains is a
different concept of what it means to be a judge and a different sense of
when that person’s impartiality ought to be reasonably questioned. A
political view, partisan attachments, even a personal relationship with a
powerful political actor, should not necessarily be regarded as
disqualifying considerations.
Professor Robertson revisits this issue at an important time. She
argues persuasively that the increasingly polarized nature of political life
makes her subject more pressing. 35 Citing social science data, she
29. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 762.
30. See Reilly, supra note 1.
31. See id.
32. Roberts: ‘My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat’, CNN (Sept. 12,
2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ [https://perma.cc/6XTNPM6K].
33. The term was coined by British Psychologist D.W. Winnicott to refer to mothers who
gradually withdraw from their children and do not attend to their every need. See D.W.
WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REALITY 10 (1971). The idea is that the imperfection is what makes for
a good mother.
34. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493,
504–05 (2013).
35. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 751–52.
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explains that the public believes that judges can remain impartial but that,
in politically sensitive cases, people equate impartiality with outcomes
that correspond with their own political views.36 Meanwhile, the public
is more polarized, less likely to agree with those from other parties, and
more insulated in and assured of its own ideology. 37 Political groups like
the Heritage Foundation have consciously recruited young lawyers to
their cause and prepared future judicial clerks in a judicial philosophy
that leads to consistently conservative rulings. 38
All of this may make it harder to persuade the public that President
Trump is wrong about judges. Without faith in the judiciary, the
legitimacy of the courts is placed in jeopardy and the rule of law itself is
put at risk. But Professor Robertson’s own data provides some comfort.
The public does trust the courts. Of course, those on both sides of the
aisle rail in indignation when a decision does not go their way. But, as
she argues, they accept the ruling and abide by it, albeit reluctantly. Even
if judges are doing politics by other means, the way they do it matters.
They use certain forms of reasoning, abide by certain rules, and adhere to
formal and informal traditions. While the public may be skeptical about
whether this process prevails over a completely outcome-oriented
partisan determination in any given case, the public is more or less
accepting of this fact as a general matter.
If Professor Robertson is right that the legitimacy of the judiciary is at
greater risk than it has been in the past, a premise we are not sure we
share, her proposed changes may not be an adequate solution. She
proposes using the jury and the appellate system as a check on
impermissible bias at the trial level, but the kind of political bias that she
discusses tends to have a greater effect at the appellate level, especially
in the Supreme Court, where her proposed solutions would not apply. 39
Professor Robertson has two suggestions relating to recusal. She
argues that each litigant should have one peremptory challenge to
eliminate a judge, a solution that eighteen states have implemented. 40
First, like the jury and appellate system, this system of judicial challenges
tends to apply in trial court settings where the problem of partisan bias is
least severe. The other problem with this proposal is that it risks
36. Id. at 764.
37. But see Tim Wu, The Oppression of the Supermajority, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/opinion/oppression-majority.html
[https://perma.cc/C4GW-B2ZX] (arguing that the defining problem of our time is not polarization
and, in fact, the vast majority of the public tends to agree about many important issues).
38. See Adam Liptak, Conservative Heritage Foundation Revives Training Academy for
Future
Clerks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/heritage-foundation-clerks-trainingacademy.html [https://perma.cc/EUG2-SNUX].
39. See Whitehouse, supra note 8.
40. Robertson, supra note 4, at 771.
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importing a host of problems of peremptory challenges in the jury context
into judicial selection. 41 Peremptory challenges have been regulated in
such a way that their use can reinforce rather than eliminate bias in the
system.42 Courts that adopt a peremptory challenge for judges would risk
introducing these problems without necessarily solving the problem of
perceived or actual partisan bias, especially since some jurisdictions will
have a high concentration of judges of a particular political bent. Finally,
Professor Robertson suggests more explicit rules for recusal. 43 The
standards, she argues, are so nebulous that judges rarely recuse and often
feel personally insulted if asked to do so. 44 Specific guidelines could be
useful, but it is hard to imagine which rules would effectively address
partisan bias. Would dinner with a political candidate suffice for recusal,
or a close personal relationship with a politician? In our view, partisan
bias is so deeply entangled with valuable life experience, intuition, and
judgment that it would be hard to find rules that eliminated partisan bias
effectively.
Further, judicial institutions can endeavor to reduce the negative
influence of judges’ implicit partisan bias by educating judges about, and
making them aware of, their biases, while at the same time teaching
techniques to promote impartial judicial decision-making.45 Intuitions,
infused as they are with partisan and other biases, may not be a bad place
to start as long as judges are trained to check their instincts by deliberately
employing these accepted processes. To compete with efforts of entities
such as the Heritage Foundation to influence judges and their law
41. See Nancy J. King, Batson for the Bench: Regulating the Peremptory Challenge of
Judges, 73 CHI-KENT L REV. 509, 509–10 (1998). For criticisms based on efficiency and other
concerns see Stephen B. Burbank, Unwarranted Distrust of Federal Judges, 81 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC. 7, 41 (1997).
42. For criticism of the Supreme Court’s approach to eliminating bias in peremptory
challenges, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges and The Review of Jury Verdicts 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156–57 (1989);
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 44–46 (2001); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court,
Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511,
524 (1994); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional
Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 214 (2003).
43. Robertson, supra note 4, at 770.
44. See id. at 760.
45. In other contexts, the profession has strived for a more equal, and less biased,
profession. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 485 (2019)
(explaining that it violates the code of judicial conduct for judges who perform marriages to refuse
to perform marriages for same sex couples); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM.
BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983) (establishing that it is professional misconduct to engage in
conduct “that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law”).
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clerks,46 the federal Judicial Conference and its state counterparts could
institute training for judges that focuses on professionalism. 47 They
would not, of course, teach judges that political views and ideology ought
to play no role, but they might be able to highlight the judicial processes
and traditions that tend to minimize the role that bias may play in
influencing the outcome of cases.48 Understanding the social science and
legal philosophy of the past century that explains the inevitability of bias
in decision-making might help judges to acknowledge and minimize its
influence. The myth perpetuated by Chief Justice Roberts and others of a
pure judicial philosophy may ironically allow judges to draw more
heavily on their partisan tendencies while masking their decisions in
neutral language.
Of course, both informal and formal efforts at professional
socialization have their limits. Future judges are not necessarily trained
to value and exercise impartiality, since most are members of the
practicing bar where the dominant ethos is one of partisanship. As noted,
lawyers may be appointed or elected to serve as judges precisely because
of their partisan identification. Once they join the bench, many judges
(especially federal judges) perform their work relatively autonomously,
fairly independent of the judicial bureaucracy—indeed, judicial
independence is highly valued. They may be somewhat inured to judicial
socialization.49 And the public may not necessarily value and praise
exercises in impartiality. The very same outside organizations that
46. The federal Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct recently published
an opinion identifying considerations relevant to whether, under applicable codes of conduct,
judges, law clerks, and future law clerks may properly attend privately-sponsored educational
programs. See U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE ON CODES OF CONDUCT ADVISORY OPINION NO. 116
(2019), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02b-ch02.pdf.. For an
argument that the existing judicial regulatory rules do not adequately address privatized judicial
education, see Green, supra note 20, at 1000–05 (arguing that privatized judicial education
“pose[s] a risk not only to public confidence in the integrity of individual judges, which judicial
ethics regulation addresses reasonably well, but also a risk to public confidence in the judiciary
as an institution. Judicial regulation fails to take account of the latter problem, created by the
aggregation of potentially small influences on individual judges.”).
47. The Judicial Conference was created in 1922 with the goal of rationalizing and
improving the administration of justice. William W. Shwarzer, The Federal Judicial Center and
the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1995). In
the 1950s, the Judicial Conference undertook new research and training projects, including
implementing an orientation program for new judges. Id. at 1132. In 1966, the Judicial Conference
proposed legislation that passed the following year, creating a Judicial Center, which would focus
on education and training of court personnel. See id. at 1132–33.
48. Others have suggested related mechanisms for helping judges check their instincts and
reduce improper bias. See Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 33–43 (suggesting, among other things,
more time to deliberate, more requirements about written opinions, and checklists).
49. Cf. Haley, supra note 24, at 90 (“[C]ommon experience and the elite nature of the
English-styled judiciary in turn strengthen the effectiveness of peer pressures (social disapproval)
as a mechanism to control individual judicial behavior.”).

2018]

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH JUDICIAL PARTISANSHIP

123

promote partisanship in the judicial selection process may give positive
reinforcement to judges who make decisions that accord with the
particular organizations’ partisan preferences. Not only that, but certain
accepted judicial philosophies, such as originalism, have come to be
virtually synonymous with a particular ideological agenda. This makes
disentangling inappropriate partisan impulses from acceptable judicial
behavior even harder. 50 Part of the appeal of originalism is that it purports
to remove subjectivity from judicial decision-making, but like all judicial
reasoning it inevitably fails to do so. 51
Finally, the bar, the media, and educational institutions need to do a
better job of educating the public about judges and their role in upholding
the rule of law. It is widely accepted in the academy, and among lawyers
themselves, that ideology inevitably plays a role in judicial decisionmaking. It is less clear how well the public understands this. Warped
expectations and understanding of judges may contribute to the public
reaction Professor Robertson describes. President Trump’s and Chief
Justice Roberts’s overly-simplified characterizations of judicial decisionmaking dominate public discourse, leaving little room for a more nuanced
understanding of the judiciary. Perhaps the outrage and crisis in
legitimacy that Professor Robertson describes would be mitigated if the
public were to have a more sophisticated understanding of what judges
actually do.52 One silver lining of the current political climate is that the
public commentary about courts and justice provides just such a civics
lesson. While the exchange between the President and Chief Justice was
reductive, it nonetheless focused the public attention on a largely ignored
question—how do and should judges make decisions? If the public is
primed to listen and judges are better trained in how to act and how to
educate litigants, juries, and spectators, the fear of politics co-opting the
judicial branch could be allayed if not eliminated.

50. See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626, 630 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New
Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610, 617 (2008).
51. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 617.
52. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s
Politics, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 971, 977–80 (2000) (arguing that the crisis in the legitimacy of the
courts or the level of concern for the countermajoritarian power of courts can be affected by
changing expectations about the function of the judiciary and the role of judicial review).

